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Abstract 
While there have been many studies that examine contagion within the Euro-zone, this paper 
investigates the potential contagion from changes in the Greek sovereign risk premium over 2009-2016, 
as measured by the yield on 10 year government bonds, to six European countries outside of the Euro-
zone all of which operated a managed float against the Euro. We find evidence of contagion to potential 
Euro-zone ascendants (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), but ‘flight to safety’ (or safe haven) effects 
for the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a considerable amount of research done on the effects of crises in Greece after 2009 on 
other members of the Euro-zone. The evidence generally suggests that the crises exerted significant 
contagion effects (see, for example, Mink and de Haan, 2013, Ludwig, 2014, and Metiu, 2012) although 
the evidence is mixed about the extent to which this reflects unjustified or "pure" contagion. Much less 
attention has been paid to the extent to which effects were experienced in European economies outside 
the Euro-zone. To address this issue we examine the effects of relative changes in the Greek sovereign 
risk premium on two groups of non-Euro-zone countries. The first group comprises three Central and 
Eastern European countries that are geographically close to the Euro-zone and that have committed 
themselves to become members of the zone in the future: the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU) and 
Poland (PO). The second group comprises three countries (United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland (CH) and 
Sweden (SW)), that have chosen not to be part of the Euro-zone. Of these both the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland are major international financial centers.  
In principle, it is possible that the effects of the crises in Greece on other countries could be either 
positive or negative. If higher risks in the Euro-zone are expected to lead to increased risk in other 
countries then their risk premia should also rise. However, if following a crisis in the Euro-zone, 
countries outside it are seen as a safe haven then capital leaving the Euro-zone and entering non-euro 
countries could drive down the yield on government bonds and reduce their interest rates. 
The six countries we investigate have all maintained managed floats with the euro, although the 
variation in the bilateral nominal exchange rates have been much greater for the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland than for the other four countries.1 The GBP/Euro rate and Swiss Franc/Euro rates have 
coefficients of variation of 20 per cent and 23 per cent respectively over the sample period from 1st 
October 2009 to mid-August 2016, whereas the Swedish krona has a coefficient of variation of just 
under 7 per cent. All three Central and Eastern European countries have coefficients of variation of 5 
percent or less. It is therefore possible to test the joint hypothesis that the degree of international 
financial integration and exchange rate flexibility are significant in accounting for both the sign and 
extent of contagion. We should emphasize that we are using the term contagion in its broad sense and 
do not attempt to divide it into rational and non-rational components as some studies do (see, for 
example, Ludwig, 2014; Giordano et al., 2013).  
                                                          
1 Switzerland did maintain a pegged rate against the euro for part of the period in question. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature and 
explains how we contribute to the existing body of research. Section 3 briefly explains the model we use 
and the econometric methodology we adopt. Section 4 considers the times series properties of the data 
with a view to model selection.   Section 5 presents the main results which show the statistical 
significance of contagion and safe haven effects from the Greek crises. Section 6 offers a few brief 
concluding comments. 
 
2. Literature review 
When applied to economics and to financial markets the concept of contagion turns out to be far from 
straightforward. It has been interpreted in the literature in a number of ways and has been applied to 
various dimensions of economic activity and to various financial assets including bonds, equities and CDS 
instruments. While in conventional medical usage it relates to the spread of disease, the notion of 
contagion in the context of economics and financial markets has been decomposed in order to examine 
the channels through which spreading occurs. 
Contagion is often distinguished from interdependence. With a relatively high level of international 
economic integration, events or economic performance in one country may be expected to influence 
economic performance in others. By definition, open economies exhibit a degree of interdependence 
through their trade and financial linkages. The closer and more important these are, the greater the 
interdependence is likely to be. Some studies have interpreted contagion as representing a degree of co-
movement that goes beyond what would be expected as a consequence of interdependence (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002). The channels through which contagion in its broadest form occurs have been 
examined empirically by Forbes (2012) and by Stracca (2015). Forbes (2012) not only reviews the 
literature on the channels of contagion but discovers that countries are more vulnerable to contagion 
when they have a more levered banking system, greater trade exposure, weaker macroeconomic 
fundamentals and larger international portfolio investment liabilities. In the narrower context of the 
euro crisis in 2010-2012, Stracca (2015) finds that the most consistent conduits of contagion are trade 
exposure to the euro area, EU membership and whether a currency is pegged to the euro. 
Sub-sections of the literature have examined different types of contagion and have explored different 
methodologies for trying to distinguish between them. In addition, the literature has examined 
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contagion in the case of specific economic and financial crises, such as the East Asian crisis in 1997/98 
and more recently the post 2009 crisis in the Euro-zone. 
As applied to financial markets, individual studies have attempted to discriminate between wake-up call 
contagion, shift contagion and pure contagion. In the last of these categories the notion is that 
developments in one country lead to changes in market sentiment that then spread to financial markets 
in other countries, irrespective of the underlying fundamentals. In this sense a distinction has 
sometimes be made between ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ contagion. 
Much of the early literature on contagion has been well summarized by Forbes (2012)2. She explores the 
different interpretations of the term and points to the empirical difficulties in distinguishing between 
the different types of contagion. She also critically evaluates the alternative ways of measuring 
contagion using probability analysis, cross market correlations, VAR models, and latent factor/GARCH 
models, as well as an approach based on extreme negative values. Many different statistical correlation 
techniques have been used in examining contagion, including dynamic conditional correlation (Engle, 
2002; Chiang et al, 2007), asymmetric generalized conditional correlations (Cappiello et al. 2006), and 
copula functions (Kenourgiois et al. 2011; Samitas and Tsakalos, 2013). The methods of measuring 
contagion need to recognize important underlying issues that are associated with potential two way 
causality, endogeneity and omitted variables. For example, correlation does not necessarily imply 
contagion. A common shock that affects all countries in a similar way will result in relatively high 
correlation coefficients even in the absence of contagion. 
In much of the literature, measures of association across financial markets do not distinguish between 
periods when markets are rising and when they are falling. Viewed from this perspective contagion may 
claim to have been found even in circumstances where economic and financial developments are 
improving. Contagion is defined to exist when observed associations are positive, with markets moving 
together in either an upward or a downward direction. In this regard the definition of contagion often 
used in the economics literature departs from its medical usage. 
As noted above, a significant proportion of the literature on contagion focuses on the crises that have 
been experienced in the Euro-zone since 2009. Forbes (2012) discovers that contagion is stronger in the 
Euro-zone than in her full sample of countries. However, she puts this down to relatively close economic 
                                                          
2 In the interests of brevity we do not directly cite the references that are included in the survey article by Forbes 
(2012) except where they are directly and specifically relevant. 
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and financial integration rather than a particularly large degree of pure contagion. Aizenman et al (2012) 
use an event study framework to examine the impact of the Euro-zone crisis on developing countries. 
Using a similar approach Stracca (2015) investigates the effects of the crisis on a wider range of both 
advanced OECD countries and non-OECD emerging and developing economies. He discovers that the 
crisis contributed to a rise in global risk aversion and a fall in equity returns, mainly in the financial 
sector. In relation to what we do in this paper it is interesting to note that Stracca finds that the effect of 
the Euro-zone crisis of 2010-12 on government bond yields outside the euro area is generally small or 
insignificant, and muted when compared to the effects on equities. However, he also reports that there 
is a tendency for bond yields to fall after a crisis event in ‘safer’ countries, as measured by composite 
risk ratings from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Other studies of contagion in the Euro-zone have focused more specifically on the effects of the crisis in 
Greece on other Euro-zone countries. Using a DCC-GARCH model, Missio and Watzka (2011) test 
dynamic correlations between Greece’s risk premium and risk premia in Portugal, Spain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, as measured by the spread on ten year government bond yields 
compared to Germany, in the period between December 31, 2008, and December 31, 2010. They find 
that yield spreads in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Belgium increased along with those in Greece, but they do 
not offer any tests of significance.  
By separating countries into peripheral and core groups within the Euro-zone and then using a spatial 
panel model, Muratori (2014) investigates contagion among selected Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries over the period between January 2007 and the end of September 2013. Contagion is 
once again based on the movement in ten-year government bond yield spreads and is found to exist, 
especially among peripheral countries.  
Other studies have found more limited evidence of contagion.  For example, Philippas and Siriopoulos 
(2013) test for contagion by focusing on bond markets in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and France, from January 3, 2001, to December 31, 2012. They use a time-varying spillover 
regime switching model and a time-varying conditional copula model. While they find that bond markets 
in France, Germany and the Netherlands were negatively affected by the crisis in Greece, they find no 
significant contagion effect on Portugal, Italy and Spain.  
Pragidis et al. (2015) also look for possible contagion effects from Greece to France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, by examining ten-year Greek government bond yields between July 2006 and 
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July 2012. Using a corrected dynamic conditional correlation model, they find that the correlations 
between Greece and the other countries’ bond yields decreased after the eruption of the Greek crisis. 
During the crisis period, only Irish and Portuguese bond yields were significantly correlated with the 
Greek bond yield. 
In related work, (Bird, et al, 2017), we examine the extent to which the strength and pattern of 
contagion in the Euro-zone differed between the periods of the first and second Greek crises. We 
discover that there is evidence of contagion in both periods and that it exists for both the other crisis 
countries in our sample as well as for France and the Netherlands.  
In this paper we add to the extant literature in a number of ways. We use a MGARCH methodology and 
examine a time period running from 2009 to 2016. More importantly we focus on the effects of the 
Greek crises on countries outside the Euro-zone. Here we distinguish between two sub groups. One 
comprises three non-euro countries that have stated their intention to join the Euro-zone at some point 
in the future (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). The second sub group comprises three that have 
not (the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden). Within the latter group we include two important 
international financial centres; the UK and Switzerland.  
 
3. The Model and Methodology 
Although we do not specify a detailed model, our broad hypothesis is that, in association with crises in 
the Euro-zone, markets will perceive non-euro countries that are more closely aligned with the euro as 
being relatively more risky than those that are not. Indeed, with increasing perceived risks in parts of the 
Euro-zone, it seems plausible that international capital will flow not only into countries within the Euro-
zone that are perceived as being relatively less risky, such as Germany, but also out of the Euro-zone 
altogether and towards important international financial centers such as the UK and Switzerland. The 
consequence of this is that interest rates in these countries will decline relative to those in Greece, and 
perhaps even relative to Germany. In principle, therefore, crises in the Euro-zone could have either 
contagion effects or safe haven effects on non-euro countries. 
We do not seek to distinguish between the different channels through which any observed spill-over 
effects occur.  In principle, however, crises in the Euro-zone could have led markets to call into question 
the future of the euro zone itself. To the extent that crises increased the probability of the Euro-zone 
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breaking apart, there could have been strong negative effects on the Euro-zone's neighbouring 
countries, particularly those with relatively close economic and financial ties with the Euro-zone. On the 
other hand, increased uncertainty about the future of the euro could also result in a movement of 
capital out of the euro and into other currencies, including those of neighbouring non euro countries.  
In what follows we investigate whether for some non-euro countries ‘safe haven’ effects are exhibited 
rather than conventional contagion effects.  
Where there are connections between crises in different countries, there is the problem of establishing 
the direction of causality. In the context of the Euro-zone it is possible that the connections between 
crises in Greece and in other Euro-zone countries ran in both directions. Given the focus of our research, 
these issues are of relatively limited concern. But, it still remains interesting to see whether common 
external factors affected all the non-euro countries in our sample in a similar qualitative way.  
While reverse causation may have been important when considering crises in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, it seems much less likely that there would have been strong causal connections between 
changes in risk premia in countries outside the Euro-zone and in Greece. Even if such reverse causality 
were to exist, the question remains of whether the associations were positive or negative. 
The Greek sovereign risk premium( )GRρ  is defined as the difference between the 10-year Greek( )GRr  
and German ( )r  long-term bond yields measured in euros, that is: GRt GRt tr rρ = − . Similarly, as is 
common in the recent literature we express the interest differential for all other countries in our sample 
relative to the German long-term bond yield. The ‘home’ interest differential for these countries is 
defined as ( )it it it tr x rρ = − − where is the long-term sovereign bond yield of the home country i in 
period t in its domestic currency and is the expected bilateral depreciation of the home currency 
against the euro. In the case of a highly, but imperfectly integrated EU capital market, it is postulated 
that the home country and Greek asset returns and risk premia will be related such that  
  0 1it GRt itρ β β ρ ε= + +         (1) 
itr
itx
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where 1β measures the impact of a rise in the Greek risk premium on the home country risk premium3. 
The sign of 1β  is strictly ambiguous. In the case of direct contagion 1β  is expected to be positive as the 
risk spreads to other countries whose bonds are perceived as having similar risk characteristics to Greek 
bonds and whose economies and currencies are closely linked to the value of the euro. But the sign of 
1β  can also be negative if the home country is deemed to be a safe haven.  In this case investors flee 
from euro-denominated assets and purchase home country bonds denominated in other currencies. If 
this capital flow is sufficiently large it will raise the price of home country bonds and lower their yields. 
Unless Germany's interest rates for some reason, and to a greater extent, fall by more this will reduce 
the interest differential. In such cases the implication is that, in search of greater safety, more funds 
would be diverted to countries outside the Euro-zone than to Germany.  
Such changes in market perceptions would be likely to have an immediate effect on exchange rates, but 
not necessarily on expected future changes. Unlike the risk free case where uncovered interest parity 
would imply that any differentials in interest rates would be offset by expected changes in exchange 
rates, where differentials only reflect expectations of default risk there would be no further expected 
changes in the spot exchange rate. Of course expectations may not be fully efficient, so in imperfect 
markets the initial changes in exchange rates could generate expectations of further changes or of 
reversals. However, for the model tested here whether the euro is ex ante expected to depreciate, 
appreciate or remain the same against outside countries is unimportant, as what matters is the total risk 
premium. So the risk premia of assets which are perceived to exhibit similar risk characteristics as Greek 
bonds will rise with the Greek risk premium 1( 0)β > . The interest differential for assets which are 
deemed to be relatively less risky will move inversely with the Greek premium 1( 0)β < . Such an inverse 
relationship would be consistent with a safe haven effect. To allow for possible expected changes in 
exchange rates, and in addition to our base case of no changes, we also provide a set of estimates where 
the actual change in the following day is assumed to have been expected.4  
The interest differential with respect to Germany is often referred to as the risk premium. For the crisis 
countries themselves this seems appropriate as German bonds are frequently taken as the low risk 
                                                          
3 Equation (1) collapses to uncovered interest rate parity in the very special case where 0β =0 and 1β =1, although 
this parity condition is not central to the analysis here.  
4 Of course there are many other ways to proxy expectations but since the expectations are not crucial to the 
analysis we limit ourselves to this one measure. As predicted we find that using this proxy does not substantially 
affect the results. 
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benchmark. When countries outside of the euro zone are investigated, however, interest differentials 
against Germany can also reflect changes in risk free, or more accurately, low risk, rates in those 
countries. Particularly where we find interest rates to fall, such as in the UK, it seems unlikely that this 
was primarily because perceptions had become that the UK was less risky. Rather, capital inflows from 
the countries perceived to have had increases in risk would bid up bond prices and lower interest rates. 
Thus we refer to the effects on interest differentials rather than risk premia although, for countries 
where the differentials increase rather than fall, the changes may mainly result from changes in risk 
premia. Thus, for these countries, we will still often refer to risk premia. 
While interest rates in Germany fell substantially over the period it seems likely that this was because of 
slow economic growth and the flooding of markets with liquidity by the European Central Bank, rather 
than because of a perception that Germany had become less risky in absolute as opposed to relative 
terms. Indeed, in absolute terms it seems more likely that Germany would have been perceived as 
riskier than before the crisis, given Germany's heavy private sector financial exposure to Greece and the 
likely consequences of a possible breakup of the euro zone.  Therefore, it seems plausible that capital 
flight from the crisis countries would go not only into the ‘safer’ countries within the euro zone, but also 
to ‘safe’ countries outside the zone.  
To estimate the interest differential model as specified in (1) the error term, itε , is assumed to have a 
mean of zero, but a time-varying variance such that (0, )t tN Hε  . This is in recognition of the fact that 
not only are the errors very unlikely to exhibit constant variance, but also the asset returns may exhibit 
volatility clustering, whereby the current level of volatility is positively related to its level in the 
immediately preceding periods. The model we use is therefore in the MGARCH class of models. We use 
the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) method proposed by Engle (2002), which has the advantage 
of dealing directly with heteroskedasticity, as well as being able to estimate multiple country risk premia 
without adding too many parameters.    
The multivariate conditional variance is specified as: 
 t t t tH D R D=       (2) 
where tD is the ( )n n× diagonal matrix of time varying standard deviations from univariate GARCH 
models with ,ii th  on the ith diagonal, and 1,2, ,i n=  ; tR  is the ( )n n×  time-varying correlation 
10 
 
matrix. The DCC model, following Engle (2002), can be estimated using a two-stage approach to 
maximize the log-likelihood function. If we let θ denote the parameters in tD  and φ the parameters in 
tR  then the log-likelihood function is: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 1
1 1
1 1( , ) log(2 log log
2 2
T T
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t
l n D D R u R u u uθ φ π ε ε− −
= =
   ′ ′ ′= − + + + − + −   
   
∑ ∑          (3) 
where tu  is the ( )n n× matrix of risk premium residuals transformed by their standard deviations, from 
the univariate stage of the estimation, such that an individual element is 1/2, ,/i t it ii tu hε
−= .5 
 
4.  The Data Set and Descriptive Statistics  
The model is estimated using daily data from 1st October 2009 until 12th August 2016 which, allowing for 
weekends and bank holidays, gives 1,746 observations for estimation.  Daily 10-year sovereign bond 
yields were taken from investing.com and daily spot exchange rate data from the ECB website, for all six 
‘home’ countries plus Greece. Exchange rate expectations were computed to reflect the actual ex post 
change in the exchange rate the following day, so that
1 1(( / ) 1)) 100 (( / ) 1)) 100t t t t t tx E e e e e+ += − × = − × where te is the spot exchange rate and tE is the 
expectations operator at time period t. Consistent with most of the literature on the Euro-zone crisis we 
investigated the full period rather than breaking it down into sub periods.6  
Table 1 presents the summary descriptive statistics of the variables. These show that the Greek risk 
premium is very much higher, and has a very much larger standard deviation than the other countries in 
the sample. Switzerland on average has a lower 10-year bond yield than Germany, but also exhibits 
much higher kurtosis and skewness than the other sample countries. Skewness and kurtosis are higher 
                                                          
5 Lee and Long (2009) propose extending the DCC M-GARCH model by additionally allowing dependence between 
the uncorrelated residuals through a copula function, to model the dependence structure of a multivariate 
distribution separately from the marginal distribution functions. This extension, however, is inappropriate, as we 
treat the Greek risk premium as exogenous and estimate the dependence of the six selected countries’ interest 
rate differentials on the Greek risk premium.  
 
6 In other work (Bird et al, 2017) we have identified two Greek crises in the period 2009-15 and find that contagion 
across other crisis countries in the Euro-zone, as well as economically stronger Euro-zone countries occurred in the 
aftermath of both of them. 
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for all countries when ex post expected exchange rate changes are taken into account, although for both 
the United Kingdom and Sweden the skew becomes negative. 
Table 2 presents the time series properties of the data. These show that, apart from Switzerland, and 
with static exchange rate expectations, the country interest differentials are stationary. In the interest 
differential measure that excludes exchange rate movements, a drift term was included in the 
stationarity test to capture any random drift induced by excluding the change in the exchange rate. 
Because the interest differentials are stationarity I(0) processes they cannot be cointegrated.  
Table 3 reports the Granger causality tests under both constant and changing exchange rates. With a 
constant exchange rate, no single country interest differential drives the Greek risk premium, whilst the 
Greek risk premium is shown to drive four of the six countries’ risk premia. This suggests that our 
assumption that changes in the Greek risk premium are exogenous is supported in four of the six cases. 
Allowing for exchange rate changes strengthens this conclusion, with only the UK’s risk premium not 
being Granger-caused by the Greek risk premia. Although this may initially appear inconsistent with a 
safe haven effect as far as the UK is concerned, it may equally reflect the basic weakness of the Granger 
causality tests in that excluded variables can ‘Granger cause’ both variables, rendering the test 
unhelpful. In addition, in this case the fact that the data are daily, and agents may well have forward-
looking expectations, means that we cannot rule out the possibility that causality may be observed as 
flowing in the ‘wrong’ direction. On balance, however, it seems plausible to treat the crises in Greece 
and the related changes in the Greek risk premium as the main drivers.   
 
5. Econometric Results 
Table 4 shows the results when the expected exchange rate change is assumed to be zero.  There is 
contagion from Greece to the other three Central and Eastern (CEEC) EU members’ risk premia, as  
1 0β > and is statistically significant. However, the opposite is the case for the three western European 
countries, as 1 0β < . This we interpret as reflecting safe haven or ‘flight to safety’ effects. Table 5A 
shows a very similar set of results when exchange rate changes are incorporated into the estimations.7  
                                                          
7 Gebka and Karoglou (2013) report a positive correlation between stock returns in Greece and the UK, Germany 
and France. As mentioned in the literature review, Stracca (2015) also discovers different effects of the euro crisis 
on equities and bond yields. However, this finding is not necessarily inconsistent with our findings since as Forbes 
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In addition, in both versions of the model, the absolute values of the 1β coefficients are smaller for the 
three advanced economies than for the three CEEC economies, suggesting that the offsetting exchange 
rate changes are larger in these economies. Moreover, the 1β coefficients are very similar in size under 
both expectations scenarios, suggesting that the actual next day depreciation of the euro is not an 
important element in the transmission of changes in the Greek risk premium to other EU member 
states, as well as Switzerland.  
Furthermore, by comparing the final columns of Tables 4 and 5a, it seems that with static exchange rate 
expectations, the effects of any shock persist longer in every case (except for Switzerland). This may 
suggest that the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate is related to the persistence of the shocks, such 
that greater nominal exchange rate flexibility is commensurate with less persistence. The Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary, for example, have the lowest falls in persistence and the least flexible 
exchange rates over the sample period.  By contrast, the countries with the largest falls in persistence 
are Sweden and the UK, which are countries with more flexible exchange rates.   
Switzerland appears to be different. It has the most variable exchange rate, and yet the effect of shocks 
persists longer relative to the other Western European economies. Table 5a shows a rise in persistence 
and potential instability8. Having experimented with higher order GARCH models for Switzerland 
without achieving dynamic stability, we drop Switzerland from the sample and re-estimate the model. 
The results are shown in Table 5b.  They concur with those presented in Table 4. There is significant 
contagion to the CEEC economies, but flight to safety effects for both Sweden and the UK.  
In general, as far as the direction and magnitude of the contagion effects are concerned, the variability 
of the nominal exchange rate is not important. In terms of persistence, the adjustment to shocks is more 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2012) points out the risk properties associated with equities are different from those associated with government 
bonds. To some extent, equities and bonds may be asset substitutes. Bonds may be perceived as safer. Moreover, 
in as much as the stocks of multinational companies are traded in stock markets, share prices on the London stock 
exchange may reflect the poorer economic prospects of Euro-zone countries in the aftermath of crises. 
 
8 Switzerland underwent major changes in its exchange rate policy over the sample period. Although its exchange 
rate showed the greatest variability against the euro over the whole sample period there have been periods of 
stability and great variability. Between 1st October 2009 and mid August 2011 the Swiss franc appreciated against 
the euro by some 40 per cent. Between February 2012 and December 2014 the Swiss franc was basically pegged 
against the Euro although this was followed by a very sharp appreciation of some 18 per cent between early 
December 2014 and the end January 2015. These sudden shifts perhaps explain the increased persistence and 
potential instability of the Swiss results under forward-looking expectations. Given the importance of Switzerland 
as a financial centre however, it is important to retain it in the sample, especially since, as noted above, exchange 
rate volatility is not essential for our contagion hypothesis.   
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quickly dissipated the more flexible is the ‘home’ currency against the euro. To a limited extent, 
exchange rate flexibility moderates the spill-over effects from the increases in the mean risk premium in 
Greece to the home economies.   
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
While it has been shown elsewhere in the literature that the effects of the crises in Greece in the period 
following 2009 were felt in other Euro-zone countries, there has been little investigation into the effects 
on European economies that did not belong to the Euro-zone. The results reported in this paper show 
that there was contagion to other EU member states that had stated their intention of acceding to 
membership of the Euro-zone, despite the fact that these countries generally had a degree of exchange 
rate flexibility vis-a-vis the euro. Probably more important was that these countries were not viewed as 
providing particularly safe assets. Thus they could be negatively affected by a general flight to safety. In 
sharp contrast, in the cases of the UK and Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Sweden, there seem to 
have been safe haven effects associated with the crises in Greece.   
There remain a number of interesting aspects of the Greek and Euro-zone crises to explore in more 
detail. For example, to what extent do the patterns of flights to safety change over different stages of 
the crises and through what mechanisms do they emerge. To explain the patterns it would be helpful to 
gain a better understanding of the motivations behind capital movements and the extent to which they 
are influenced by economic and behavioural factors. However, an examination of these issues lies 
beyond the scope of this paper.9  In contemplating the channels of contagion our results can, however, 
be usefully interpreted in the context of the existing literature which emphasizes trade and financial 
exposure to the euro area. For example, it may be posited that the banking systems of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland were perceived by markets as being more vulnerable, albeit perhaps 
indirectly, to Greek default and to the possibility of a collapse of the Euro-zone as a whole. Again, a 
detailed examination of the channels of contagion and safe haven effects identified in this paper is a 
subject for further research. 
                                                          
9 Bird et al (2017b) provide a preliminary empirical investigation of the extent to which the movements in risk 
premia during the Euro-zone crisis straddling the period 2009-2015 are consistent with the assumption that 
markets are efficient. They discover that while the EMH makes a useful contribution, there are occasional 
departures from it that can usefully be accounted for by theories of behavioural finance. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Risk premia Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Greece 10.931 7.246 1.584 5.020 
Switzerland -0.845 0.294 0.010 2.063 
United Kingdom 0.802 0.418 0.046 1.634 
Sweden 0.226 0.251 0.033 2.161 
Czech Republic 0.726 0.504 0.663 2.657 
Hungary  4.424 1.258 0.787 3.051 
Poland 2.799 0.579 0.337 2.451 
Expectations Adjusted 
Risk Premia 
    
Switzerland -0.827 0.522 3.144 76.503 
United Kingdom 0.804 0.566 -0.051 3.911 
Sweden 0.228 0.384 -0.256 3.195 
Czech Republic 0.721 0.551 0.714 3.407 
Hungary  4.415 1.327 0.849 3.419 
Poland 2.797 0.671 0.430 3.081 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2: Time Series Statistics 
______________________________________________________________ 
Risk premia ADF (static) 
(with drift) 
ADF 
(expectations) 
Greece -2.157  
Switzerland -0.734 -16.813 
United Kingdom -1.909 -11.967 
Sweden -2.148 -17.213 
Czech Republic -2.584 -6.336 
Hungary  -1.924 -6.674 
Poland -2.275 -8.794 
   
Critical values  at 5% -1.65 -2.86 
Notes: Ho: Country risk premia are non-stationarity 
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Table 3:  Granger Causality Tests 
Risk premia static case 
Ho: ρi doesn’t 
cause ρGR 
F Pr<F H0: ρGR 
doesn’t cause ρi 
F Pr<F 
CH 1.116 0.328 CH 1.417 0.243 
UK 1.768 0.171 UK 2.611* 0.074 
SW 0.707 0.493 SW 1.756 0.173 
CZ 2.232 0.107 CZ 2.630* 0.073 
HU 0.147 0.868 HU 8.195** 0.000 
PO 3.201 0.041 PO 2.344** 0.007 
All 2.653** 0.007    
 
Risk premia (including exchange rate expectations)  
Ho: ρi doesn’t 
cause ρGR 
F Pr<F H0: ρGR 
doesn’t cause ρi 
F Pr<F 
CH 4.311 0.116 CH 21.272** 0.000 
UK 1.531 0.465 UK 3.818 0.148 
SW 0.656 0.720 SW 28.802** 0.000 
CZ 4.064 0.131 CZ 11.159** 0.004 
HU 0.221 0.805 HU 58.274** 0.000 
PO 8.095* 0.017 PO 24.937** 0.000 
All 18.319 0.106    
Note: The superscripts  ** and * denote statistical significance at the 5% and the 10% levels.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results from the DCC-MGARCH model  
 Risk Premium equations Variance equations  
 β0 β1 a b c Persistence 
 
CH 
 
-0.706*** 
(-94.64) 
 
- 0.009*** 
(-18.98) 
 
0.878*** 
(34.58) 
 
0.013 
(1.41) 
 
0.003*** 
(10.61) 
 
0.891 
UK 1.205*** 
(102.86) 
- 0.034*** 
(-43.89) 
0.876*** 
(34.10) 
0.006 
(0.55) 
0.004*** 
(8.81) 
0.882 
 
SW 
 
0.477*** 
(92.93) 
 
- 0.016*** 
(-42.78) 
0.916*** 
(34.63) 
 
-0.018* 
(-1.84) 
 
0.002*** 
(9.56) 
 
0.898 
 
CZ 
 
0.257*** 
(20.18) 
 
0.042*** 
(60.26) 
 
0.819*** 
(32.36) 
 
0.047*** 
(3.49) 
 
0.006*** 
(9.33) 
 
0.866 
HU 2.843** 
(149.74) 
0.124*** 
(82.71) 
0.868*** 
(35.44) 
-0.012 
(-1.23) 
0.033*** 
(10.55) 
0.856 
 
PO 
 
2.128*** 
(175.90) 
 
0.054*** 
(78.33) 
0.849*** 
(33.08) 
 
0.023** 
(2.02) 
 
0.007*** 
(8.70) 
 
0.872 
Notes: LL = 9451.5. The estimates of the mean-reverting process are λ1=0.3025 (38.22) and 
λ2=0.6854 (82.47).  The persistence level of the variance is calculated as the summation of the 
coefficients in the variance equations (a + b). The z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels with critical values of 2.58, 1.96 
and 1.65 respectively. Risk premium equations: 0 1it GRt itρ β β ρ ε= + + where i = CH, UK, SW, 
CZ, HU, PO and (0, )t tN Hε  . Variance equations:
2
1 1iit i i iit i ith c a h bε− −= + + . 
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Table 5a: Estimation Results from the DCC-MGARCH model (with Exchange Rate Expectations) 
 Risk Premium equations Variance equations  
 β0 β1 a b c Persistence 
 
CH 
 
- 0.711*** 
(-10.70) 
 
- 0.010*** 
(-4.18) 
 
0.878*** 
(4.24) 
 
0.227*** 
(5.75) 
 
0.013*** 
(2.76) 
 
1.105 
UK 1.263*** 
(22.47) 
- 0.038*** 
(-11.03) 
0.428*** 
(8.35) 
0.216 
(1.34) 
0.084*** 
(2.70) 
0.644 
 
SW 
 
0.459*** 
(13.22) 
 
- 0.018*** 
(-7.48) 
0.424*** 
(9.31) 
 
-0.042 
(-0.47) 
 
0.084*** 
(6.85) 
 
0.382 
 
CZ 
 
0.201** 
(2.22) 
 
0.043*** 
(4.12) 
 
0.607*** 
(7.94) 
 
0.114 
(1.03) 
 
0.043*** 
(3.24) 
 
0.721 
HU 2.830*** 
(21.81) 
0.134*** 
(10.05) 
0.496*** 
(14.87) 
0.141** 
(1.96) 
0.221*** 
(5.54) 
0.637 
 
PO 
 
2.080*** 
(34.59) 
 
0.060*** 
(10.10) 
0.464*** 
(12.35) 
 
0. 273** 
(3.59) 
 
0.064*** 
(4.27) 
 
0.737 
Notes: LL = -3232.1. The estimates of the mean-reverting process are λ1=0.3187 (23.32) and 
λ2=0.4006 (13.25).  The persistence level of the variance is calculated as the summation of the 
coefficients in the variance equations (a + b). The robust z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels with critical values of 2.58, 
1.96 and 1.65 respectively. Risk premium equations: 0 1it GRt itρ β β ρ ε= + + where i = CH, UK, 
SW, CZ, HU, PO and  (0, )t tN Hε   Variance equations:
2
1 1iit i i iit i ith c a h bε− −= + +  
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Table 5b: Estimation Results from the DCC-MGARCH model (with Exchange Rate Expectations) 
 Risk Premium equations Variance equations  
 β0 β1 a b c Persistence 
UK 1.273*** 
(39.49) 
- 0.039*** 
(-18.39) 
0.436*** 
(11.05) 
0.236*** 
(3.41) 
0.082*** 
(6.03) 
0.672 
 
SW 
 
0.452*** 
(18.67) 
 
- 0.017*** 
(-10.12) 
0.440*** 
(11.14) 
 
-0.036 
(-0.53) 
 
0.083*** 
(8.36) 
 
0.404 
 
CZ 
 
0.202** 
(6.87) 
 
0.045*** 
(17.43) 
 
0.617*** 
(14.01) 
 
0.120* 
(1.68) 
 
0.040*** 
(5.11) 
 
0.737 
HU 2.803*** 
(51.43) 
0.138*** 
(31.82) 
0.514*** 
(16.95) 
0.151** 
(2.99) 
0.213*** 
(7.00) 
0.665 
 
PO 
 
2.073*** 
(67.51) 
 
0.061*** 
(25.66) 
0.491*** 
(16.36) 
 
0. 364** 
(6.34) 
 
0.064*** 
(7.08) 
 
0.755 
Notes: The estimates of the mean-reverting process are λ1=0.3190 (21.24) and λ2=0.4554 (14.95). 
The persistence level of the variance is calculated as the summation of the coefficients in the 
variance equations (a + b). The robust z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels with critical values of 2.58, 1.96 and 1.65 
respectively. Risk premium equations: 0 1it GRt itρ β β ρ ε= + + where i = UK, SW, CZ, HU, PO and  
(0, )t tN Hε   Variance equations:
2
1 1iit i i iit i ith c a h bε− −= + + . 
 
 
